What scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean in 2030 in the wake of the Arab spring? MEDPRO Policy Paper No. 2, October 2011 (Updated 25 February 2013) by Ayadi, Rym & Sessa, Carlo
 Rym Ayadi is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in 
Brussels and Coordinator of the MEDPRO project. Carlo Sessa is Director of the Istituto di Studi 
per l’Integrazione dei Sistemi (ISIS) in Rome. 
This paper was produced in the context of the MEDPRO (Mediterranean Prospects) initiative, a 
three-year project funded under the Socio-economic Sciences & Humanities Programme of DG 
Research of the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Research Programme. MEDPRO 
Policy Papers present concise, policy-oriented analyses of the output of each MEDPRO thematic 
Work Package, with the aim of introducing the views of MEDPRO experts into the policy-making 
process in a direct and timely fashion. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal 
capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated.  
Keywords: Euro-Mediterranean partnership, Euro-Mediterranean 2030, Arab Spring   
ISBN 978-94-6138-145-3 
Available for free downloading from the MEDPRO (www.medpro-foresight.eu) 
and CEPS (www.ceps.eu) websites 
© Copyright 2011 (updated 2013), Rym Ayadi and Carlo Sessa 
 
What scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean in 2030 
in the wake of the Arab spring? 
Rym Ayadi and Carlo Sessa 
MEDPRO Policy Paper No. 2 / October 2011 (Updated 25 February 2013) 
he southern and eastern Mediterranean 
region has reached a turning point in its 
history, following the unprecedented 
uprisings that brought to an end decades of 
repressive authoritarian rule. Before 2010, the year 
of the start of the Arab revolts, the prevailing 
‘business as usual’ (BAU) scenario in EU-
Mediterranean relations consisted of a blend of 
state un-sustainability and regional cooperation 
dominated by inter-governmental relations and 
increasing depoliticisation and securitisation. In 
terms of economic development, it is important to 
note that the South Mediterranean region would 
account, under this scenario, for a mere 3% of 
global GDP in 2030 (up from 2% in 2010, with 
90% of the wealth creation originating from 
Turkey and Israel). During the last decade, indeed, 
European policy-makers seem to have equated 
stagnation with stability, choosing to cooperate 
with autocratic regimes. Political reform and 
human rights were sidelined, while issues such as 
combating terrorism and containing migration 
dominated the policy agenda. The final step in this 
process was the creation of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM), which was revealed to be a 
fragile edifice, dominated by France’s 
determination to inter-governmentalise Euro-Med 
relations. Unsustainability coupled with phony 
stability were believed to offer the basis for a solid 
future for the countries in the south Mediterranean, 
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as no credible prospects for radical democratic 
political change were foreseen; on the contrary, a 
deterioration of political freedoms and the rule of 
law was the norm rather than the exception. 
Unsatisfactorily, the European Union’s policies 
towards the region equally appeared to drive the 
region towards an unsustainable future. With the 
Arab revolts, however the future has suddenly 
become uncertain as radical domestic changes are 
being prepared and external actors’ are rethinking 
their policies towards the region. While the BAU 
scenario has clearly been eliminated by the events 
of the Arab spring, other scenarios may materialise 
in a 2030 perspective (see diagramme below), 
depending on the interaction of relevant political 
and socio-economic developments that could 
plausibly lead to one or another future.  
 
Alternative scenarios of Euro-Mediterranean policy in 2030  
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
In a highly fragile and uncertain political and 
socio-economic context in the South 
Mediterranean region pre and post Arab revolts, a 
scenario analysis appears to be the best strategic 
tool to drive adequate policy reforms towards a 
more sustainable socio-economic future. Such 
scenarios were derived from a comprehensive 
political and socio-economic reflextion on what 
determines the wealth of nations on one hand and 
the role of the European Union as a historical 
political and economic partner of the South 
Mediterranean region.  These scenarios were first 
identified, tested and agreed between the senior 
experts and finally simulated using a state of the 
art economic model.  
Let us start with the most disastrous scenario, 
expressed simply as ‘The Euro-Mediterranean 
Area under threat’, in which the Mediterranean 
Sea would become a dividing line between 
conflicting civilisations. Sporadic conflicts would 
become long-lived and would spread from one 
country to another leading to deeper political 
uncertainties and mounting economic and social 
difficulties. The non-resolution of the conflicts in 
the Middle East and the Western Sahara would 
exacerbate tensions in the Mashreq and the 
Maghreb. These uncertainties and tensions would 
offer new opportunities for terrorist organisations 
and radical movements to take power.  
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The absence of cooperating authorities would 
undermine the EU’s and other geopolitical actors’ 
capacities to achieve the necessary cooperation on 
key sectors, such as migration programmes, 
research, science, technology and education, 
agriculture, security and energy. As a result, in 
2030, the Mediterranean would become a border 
zone of broad conflicts, which, if not contained, 
would spread to the Northern frontiers. This is 
indicated in the diagramme above as the ‘red’ 
transition towards a widening gap and increasing 
tensions and conflicts between the two shores of 
the Mediterranean.  
The consequences of this scenario must not be 
underestimated for they would plague the Euro-
Mediterranean region for generations to come.  
One can envisage two alternative scenarios of 
long-term growth and sustainability, however, 
each following a different path of Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation, if the necessary 
political and economic will can be summoned. The 
Arab revolts can be taken as the point of departure 
which become launched on one or possibly both of 
these paths.  
In a perspective of a ‘Euro-Mediterranean Union’, 
recognising their shared past and believing in their 
common future, the European and the South (and 
East) Mediterranean countries would form an 
integrated region with a common market. The 
integration scheme could be inspired by the 
European Economic Area (EEA) model, 
establishing deep and comprehensive economic 
relations with full participation in the EU’s Internal 
Market, as now exists for Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland. This path would eventually result in 
the adoption of the EU acquis and would thus lead 
to more convergence and ultimately to furthering 
the economic integration. 
Under such a scenario, the current tensions and 
conflicts in the Euro-Mediterranean region would 
be settled. Since not all of the countries have 
reached the same level of political and socio- 
economic development, the differentiated approach 
of the EU as outlined in its response to the Arab 
spring, the so-called ‘renewed neighbourhood 
policy’ might give rise to a number of countries 
fulfilling the requirements to become part of the 
EU economic bloc quicker than others. At a later 
stage, this renewed neighbourhood policy would 
need to be fundamentally reoriented towards the 
philosophy of the EEA model or any other similar 
model that would give a stake in the EU Internal 
Market. The Union for the Mediterranean could 
play a role in fostering and speeding regional 
cooperation, thus deepening the economic 
integration between all countries of the region. 
However, the importance of the UfM would 
diminish over time when all south Mediterranean 
countries would have have a stake in the EU single 
market. In this scenario, the UfM is seen as a 
mechanism to revive trans-Mediterranean 
relations. 
The creation of a larger and powerful Euro-
Mediterranean community would influence the 
global scenario for the year 2030, with the 
emergence of a tri-polar world, dominated by the 
US, China and Euro-Med. This prospect is 
indicated in the diagramme above as the ‘green’ 
transition, because it entails the expansion of the 
‘green-growth’ strategies that currently underpin 
most of the EU’s policies on energy, environment 
and other key sectors to include the South 
Mediterranean. In practice, however, this scenario 
would still reflect a Euro-centric vision of the 
future.  
Another scenario that is worth considering – 
referred to as the ‘Euro-Mediterranean 
Alliance(s)’ – would keep the two regions separate: 
the EU on the North (which may or may not be 
enlarged to include the Balkan States and Turkey) 
and the Southern Mediterranean countries on the 
South (which may or may not include other 
African and Middle Eastern countries). Under such 
a scenario, there would be no perspective (or need) 
for pursuing an integration models such as the 
European Economic Area or similar models. On 
the contrary, most indications point to an 
increasingly heterogeneous region, where distinct 
but related countries and sub-regions (e.g. Western 
Mediterranean, South Mediterraean, Eastern 
Mediterranean) would work in association towards 
the same aim of sustainability within an 
increasingly interdependent world. Bilateral EU 
policies, such as the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), would shed their ‘enlargement-like’ 
approach, while multilateral policies, such as the 
UfM, would need to be revised to account for a 
more heterogeneous southern Mediterranean and 
increasing economic partnership with other regions 
such as Gulf. The latter would also feature its own 
forms of multilateral cooperation (e.g. the Arab 
League, the Arab Maghreb Union, etc.). The North 
and South would enter into cooperative contractual 
relations, featuring trade and co-development, 
political dialogue, security, as well as specific 
initiatives pertaining to youth education and 
employment opportunities, circular migration 
schemes, research, science, technology, innovation 
and infrastructure (energy, transport and ICT), 
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agriculture, food and water security, and mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change.1  
In this scenario of differentiated multilateralism, 
regional cooperation schemes would be applied in 
a more selective way with regard to participating 
actors and subject areas, fully recognising that 
Western Mediterranean, South Mediterranean and 
Eastern Mediterranean are distinct geographical 
sub-regions (even if there may be some overlap) 
each with its own specific problems, opportunities 
and challenges. Given its inherent heterogeneity, in 
all likelihood, this scenario would not entail a full 
Arab-Israeli cooperation in a common economic 
area (as the membership to a EEA-like area would 
entail in the “Euro-Mediterranean Union” vision 
would imply), but at least will require the 
neutralization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
latter could be ensured by the admission of both 
Turkey and Israel in an enlarged EU or EEA – 
facilitated by these two countries being the 
whealtier amongst the SEMCs – and the 
concomitant requirement for Israel and Turkey to 
accept the two states solution and maintain 
peaceful relationships among them, with the 
Palestinian Authority and with the other 
neighbourhoods. Also the Western Sahara conflict 
could be neutralized by Algeria and Morocco 
entering in a regional cooperation scheme (e.g. the 
Arab Maghreb Union or Arab Mediterranean 
Union). 
 Also this vision, as the previous “Euro-
Mediterranean Union” prospect, is coherent with a 
multi-polar world envisaged for the year 2030, but 
the European Union and the Southern 
Mediterranean will play separate roles on the 
global stage, maintaining preferential relationships 
of co-development on some key areas of common 
interest. This perspective is indicated in the 
diagramme as the ‘blue’ transition, because it is 
based on common policies built with the active 
contribution of people, civil society and policy-
makers on both sides of the Mediterranean, without 
the emergence of a dominant partner (the process 
is symbolically centred in the ‘blue’ Mediterranean 
Sea). 
According to Tocci (2011), the signals emitted in 
the pre- and post-Arab spring appear to point to a 
more polarised Mediterranean. Two years since the 
eruption of the Arab revolts, countries are still 
reeling from sporadic open conflict and political 
uncertainty. With no clear target or direction, they 
alternate between pressures and tensions to 
continued un-sustainability and hopes for 
                                                   
1 See Tocci (2011). 
achieving sustainability, while trying to cope with 
new realities and dynamics. The EU’s stance as 
reflected in the Commission’s Communication on 
“Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity” issued in March 2011, and 
complemented soon thereafter by “A New 
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” issued in 
May 2011, has been generally timid and focused 
on the short term, with no major visionary change 
foreseen in the state of affairs in the region. 
The EU recognises the need to offer more 
assistance to its neighbours, ranging from more 
financial benefits2 to more targeted help in 
developing and sustaining political parties (through 
the Endowment for Democracy) and civil society 
(through the Civil Society Facility). It also 
recognises the need to embark on deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs), 
which can be expected to open the door to more 
access to the EU’s single market. Moreover, it has 
promised more ‘mobility partnerships’ with the 
South Mediterranean region, which are designed to 
better manage migration flows between the EU and 
third countries, and in particular to fight illegal 
migration, in partnership with the EU, in exchange 
for enhanced possibilities of mobility between their 
countries and the EU for their citizens, in terms of 
legal migration opportunities and of short term 
movements (short stay visa issues). In parallel, 
conditionality and differentiation will be 
reinforced. 
These commitments to change are welcomed but 
they remain trapped in the logic of enlargement, 
security, vagueness, insularity and bilateral 
relationships with the South Mediterranean, as 
emphasised by Tocci (2011). 
On the multilateral dimension, the UfM role has 
not yet been reinforced in the post-Arab spring, 
although it has the potential to implement the 
sustainable development objectives in the region. 
But this untapped potential could be realized only 
if the UfM role is appropriately revised in the 
direction of a multilateral institution supporting 
flexible regional/sectoral processes and 
cooperation schemes, to account for the multipolar 
reality of the regions (and of the world) and the 
need of more balanced North-South strategies. 
This will increase the likelihood of the 
Mediterranean to tilt away of the red transition 
path, and to shift more decisively towards the 
sustainable – “blue” and “green” – transitions. 
                                                   
2 Ayadi & Gadi (2013).  
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Looking ahead to the 2030 horizon, the EU’s 
response to the challenges in the region appears 
still to reflect neither a vision towards the ‘green’ 
transition nor towards the ‘blue’. Instead, it 
remains trapped in the ‘business as usual’ scenario 
while the region is moving towards further 
polarisation and increased instability. The 
MEDPRO forward looking exercise has deeply 
analysed the macro-economic and sectoral (for 
demography, economic development, social 
cohesion, energy, environment and climate 
change) implications of the different red, blue and 
green transitions for the Mediterranean, and 
especially for the SEMCs, delivering long-term 
policy implications and recommendations to orient 
the EU policy response towards a sustainable 
Euro-Mediterranean in 2030.3  
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